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The Supreme while analysing the benchmark to decide a case based on ‘circumstantial evidence’ has upheld the death penalty in a POCSO case.
The Bench comprising of Justice Dinesh Maheshwari, Justice AM Khanwilkar and Justice C.T. Ravikumar dismissed the appeal challenging conviction of the appellant under Sections 363, 365, 376(2)(f), 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012
Brief Facts of the Case:
The appeal lies against the High Court’s order which held up the conviction and confirmed the subsequent death sentence awarded by the Trial Court to the appellant on account of been accused of kidnapping a physically and mentally challenged seven-and-a-half-year-old girl in front of her parents; having thereafter taken her to a secluded place; having committed rape upon her; and having killed her by causing injuries on her head. The prosecution case rested on circumstantial evidence and contended that the entire chain of events was complete and was conclusive of the guilt of the appellant, excluding any other hypothesis.
On the other hand, the appellant asserted that he was falsely implicated, though he did not adduce any evidence in defence. The appellant appealed in the Supreme Court that the aforementioned trial was hurriedly done and performed partially since over reliance was placed on the personal opinions of the forensic doctors and the final report was submitted soon after the arrest of the appellant, even before receiving the DNA report.
Supreme Court’s Observation:
The Supreme Court addressed the following questions in the present case:
1. Whether the accused be allowed to challenge the expeditious court proceedings on amount of lack of preparation time given to him for the case?
The Supreme Court opined that the constitutional guarantees of equality before law, protection of life and personal liberty, protection in respect of conviction, and protection against the arrest and detention, do not expand into a corresponding right with an accused person to question the swiftness of investigation and expeditious proceedings of the trial or to suggest that he has to be tried at a pace of his choice. It sounds rather preposterous that an accused would question the trial proceedings only because of the pace maintained by the prosecution and the Trial Court so as to take the trial to its logical conclusion at the earliest. While rejecting the contentions urged on behalf of the appellant, the court observed that the speed and pace expected in the cases like the present one, per force, require utmost expedition by the investigating agency as also by the Trial Court.
2. During the appeal, whether the accused be allowed to take the alibi of being provided an in-experienced counsel as a legal-aid?
The court opined that the contention that the appellant was deprived of his right of defence and he was given services of an inexperienced counsel remain too far-stretched and rather unjustified. Apart that no such grievance was ever suggested before the Trial Court or even before the High Court, the court found from the record that legal aid counsel was appointed at the request of the appellant himself and in fact, the Trial Court proceeded with the matter only after appointment of a counsel for the appellant. A perusal of the record further made it clear that the legal aid counsel left no stone unturned to defend the appellant and thoroughly cross-examined each and every witness to the minutest and minor details.
3. Whether conviction of the appellant calls for any interference?
Since the Trial Court and the High Court gave their decisions based on circumstantial evidence, the Supreme Court relied on the cases of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra and Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh to assess the basic principles relating to a case on circumstantial evidence. The 5 recognized ‘Panchsheel’ principles are as follows:
a) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established,
b) The facts so established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not
be explainable on any other hypothesis except
that the accused is guilty,
c) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,
d) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
e) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.
In the present case, the court analysed the testimonies of the witnesses, circumstances and evidences notes and collected by the Investigating Officer and the post-mortem and forensic reports, and concluded that 5 principles of circumstantial evidence were being complied with and the proof was beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, no interference is required.
4. Whether Section 42 of the POCSO Act limit the conviction of the accused under the IPC and the POCSO Act simultaneously?
The Court held that this submission, made with reference to Section 42 POCSO, is baseless. Section 42 of the POCSO Act lays down that where an offence is punishable, both under POCSO and also under IPC, then the offender, if found guilty of such offence, is liable to be punished under that Act, which provides for more severe punishment. The mandate for awarding punishment which is greater in degree does not correspondingly lead to the proposition that the appellant could not have been convicted of the offence under Section 376 IPC as also under Section 6 POCSO.
5. After the final conclusion on the guilt and after pronouncing conviction, whether the concept of ‘residual doubt’ (in favour of the accused), as such is available for the purpose of sentencing?
The court held that theoretically there is no scope for any ‘residual doubt’ operating even in the cases of circumstantial evidence. The cases in which theory of residual doubt has at all been referred, had been standing on their own facts, where alternative to death sentence was considered appropriate. However, while taking up the matter for sentencing, it is not expected to reopen the chain of circumstantial evidence to find any weak link which may fall in the category of residual doubt. The court reiterated that if at all any such doubt is reasonably existing, the very basis of conviction would be in question. To put it in other words, after the final conclusion on the guilt and after pronouncing conviction, no concept of residual doubt as such is available for the purpose of sentencing.
The appeals were dismissed; conviction of the appellant of offences under Sections 363, 365, 376(2)(f), 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 was confirmed; and the sentences awarded to the appellant, including the death=sentence for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, were also confirmed.
CASE TITLE: MANOJ PRATAP SINGH vs THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN
CASE DETAILS: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). ............. OF 2022
CORAM: Justice Dinesh Maheshwari, Justice AM Khanwilkar and Justice C.T. Ravikumar
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(With input from news agency language)
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