HC: Hate speeches delivered by political and religious leaders bulldoze constitutional ethos, warrant stringent peremptory action

 

The Delhi High Court recently comprising of a bench of Justice Chandra Dhari Singh dismissed a plea by CPI(M) leader Brinda Karat and another person to lodge an FIR against Union Minister Anurag Thakur and BJP MP Parvesh Verma for their alleged hate speech - "desh ke gaddaron ko" - exhorting the crowd to shout "goli maron saalon ko" in January, 2020 during the anti Citizenship Amendment Act protests.(BRINDA KARAT AND ANR. v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR.) 

The bench also referred to 'Bhagwat Gita' to say the leaders are role models for ordinary masses and owe their responsibility not only towards the electorate but to the society and the nation as a whole and ultimately to the Constitution.

Facts of the case  

The instant petition arises out of the impugned order of dismissal of Application of Petitioners under Section 156 (3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the “Code”) passed in Case titled Brinda Karat & Anr. v. State, by the Court of the Ld. Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (I), Rouse Avenue Courts, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the “ACMM”). 

Vide order dated 28th August 2020, the Trial Court had dismissed the Petitioners' application filed under sec. 156(3) of CrPC seeking registration of FIR for offences under sec. 153A, 153B, 295A, 298, 504, 505 and 506 of IPC, observing that prior sanction under sec. 196 of CrPC was required even at the initial stage, which was not obtained by the Petitioners. 

It was thus the case of the petitioners that the stage of cognizance does not arise at a time when directions under sec.156(3) CrPC are given, and as such, no sanction was required under either sec. 195 or 196 of CrPC for the registration of an FIR.

In January 2020, a video had surfaced of Thakur addressing a crowd that he prompted them with the slogan “Desh ke gaddaaron ko…” The crowd replied by chanting, “…goli maaro saalon ko!” The speech — which translates to “shoot the traitors of the country” — was, basically, Islamophobic and incited violence against a community. The petitioners reportedly argued that the speech, in fact, had tangible consequences — by resulting in two separate instances of firing on students of Jamia Millia Islamia, a university in Delhi that is often targeted by Hindutva supporters.

Verma, in the same month, had called the sit-in protestors at Shaheen Bagh “rapists and murderers.” He added that they “will enter your houses, they will pick up your sisters and daughters, rape them and kill them… Today, there is time. If the people of Delhi wake up now, it will be good. Then they will stay safe.”

 

Contention of the Parties 

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the communal, incendiary, and hateful speeches made by Mr. Verma and Mr. Thakur directly contributed towards fostering an atmosphere of hatred and division targeting a particular religious community. It was submitted that the speeches further served to embolden persons and contributed significantly to a rise in hostility and enmity against the anti- CAA protestors, resulting in multiple incidents of threats and violence. Some such incidents were enumerated in the Petitioner’s Application under Section 156(3) CrPC and are also enumerated in the present Petition. 

Additionally, it was submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amish Devgan v. Union of India and Ors. (2021) 1 SCC 1, has held that the impact of hate speech depends on the person who has uttered the words and a speech by a person of influence, such as a top government functionary or political leader of following, therefore carries far more credibility and impact than a common person. The Supreme Court further held that malicious intent can be derived from the context of the speech itself, the identity of the speaker, the targeted and non-targeted group, the context and circumstances when such speech was made and proximate nexus with the harm.

On the other hand Mr. Amit Mahajan, learned CGSC appearing for the Respondents submitted that the issue which arises for consideration of this Hon’ble Court is whether a sanction under Section 196 of the Code is necessary prior for any direction being issued by Ld. ACMM for registration of FIR under Section 156(3) of CrPC. 

It was submitted that a bare perusal of Section 196 of the Code would show that no court can take cognizance of any offence punishable under Chapter VI or under Section 153A, 295A or sub-section (1) of Section 505 of IPC without previous sanction of the Central Government or the State Government as the case may be. Similarly, Section 197 provides that when any person who is or was a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duty, no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction. In the present case also, the allegations have been levelled under various Sections including Section 295-A, 153-A and Section 505 of the IPC. 

Courts Observation and Judgment  

The court observed, "Hate speeches especially delivered by elected representatives, political and religious leaders based on religion, caste, region or ethnicity militate against the concept of fraternity, bulldoze the constitutional ethos, and violates Articles 14, 15, 19, 21 read with Article 38 of the Constitution and is in blatant derogation of the fundamental duties prescribed under Article 51-A (a), (b), (c), (e), (f), (i), (j) of the Constitution and therefore warrant stringent peremptory action on the part of Central and State Governments."

The bench observed, "If such investigations are ordered in routine manner for the offences under Section 295-A, 153-A and Section 505 of the IPC, that would lead to a situation where thousands of FIRs would be registered to settle scores against political opponents across the country. This would not only be undesirable and an abuse of process but would also result in choking of the already overburdened criminal justice machinery."

The bench observed, "There have been and continue to be instances of hate speeches in different parts of the country targeted against people of specific communities, based on demographic composition. There have even been instances of demographic shifts in the aftermath of such inflammatory speeches, the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits from the Kashmir valley is a prime example."  

The bench stressed that leaders who occupied high offices must conduct themselves with utmost integrity and responsibility remarked,  “Leaders owe a responsibility towards the electorate, the society/nation as a whole and ultimately to the Constitution. Thus, it does not befit the leaders to indulge in acts or speeches that cause rifts among communities, create tensions and disrupt the social fabric."

The bench dismissing the plea remarked, "The provisions of Section 156(3) for directing investigation qua offences mentioned in Section 196 of the Code cannot be exercised by the Court without sanction. There is no prima facie irregularity that is apparent upon a perusal of the impugned order. Fourthly, the petitioners have failed to satisfy the Court and no case is made out warranting the intervention of this Court at this stage."  

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(With input from news agency language)

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