The judicial philosophy of India’s new chief justice can be gleaned from his recent judgments, which show empathy for innocent citizens apprehending loss of liberty, and married women whose inability to accede to dowry demands cost them their lives.
Chief Justice of India N.V. Ramana. Photo: PTI/Files
Earlier occupants of the office of the Chief Justice of India (CJI) have had little time to articulate their judicial philosophy in judgments so soon after assuming office. Either administrative responsibilities have overwhelmed them, or they have had limited opportunities to do so during their short tenures, dictated by the fact that they retire upon turning 65. But CJI N.V. Ramana, who has a limited tenure of one year and four months, appears to be bucking the trend, with four significant judgments emerging from benches presided by him, three of which he has authored.
1. Courts must intervene to prevent brazen persecution
In Sanjay Kumar Rai v State of Uttar Pradesh, authored by Justice Surya Kant, who was part of the bench presided by CJI Ramana and Justice Aniruddha Bose, the Supreme Court held on May 7 that ‘discharge’ from wrongful prosecution is a valuable right provided to the accused. Although it is well settled that the trial court, while considering the discharge application from an accused, is not to act as a mere post office, it required a robust restatement of law from the office of the CJI to send a clear message to the courts below. The bench reiterated the law that the trial court has to sift through the evidence in order to find out whether there are sufficient grounds to try the suspect, consider the broad probabilities, total effect of evidence and documents produced and the basic infirmities appearing in the case, and so on.
More importantly, the bench made it clear that when the contents of a complaint or the other purported material on record represents a brazen attempt to persecute an innocent person, it becomes imperative upon the court to prevent the abuse of process of law.
In this case, the complainant alleged that the appellant threatened to kill him over a telephone conversation, which he had initiated and put on speaker, with two witnesses to listen to the conversation. The appellant-accused sought his discharge under Section 239 CrPC, contending that the complainant had falsely implicated him and the allegation of telephonic threats does not constitute an offence under Sections 504 and 506 of IPC (dealing with criminal intimidation). It was further averred that the investigation was not fair and was unilateral in its approach, wherein the investigating officer had made no efforts to find out the truth and had instead relied on the statement of the complainant and other planted witnesses to fasten a case against the appellant. The investigating officer did not deem it necessary to take the version of the appellant on record or consider his side of the story. A charge sheet came to be filed against the appellant/accused under Sections 504 and 506 IPC based on the statement of the complainant and the affidavits of two witnesses alone.
Earlier occupants of the office of the Chief Justice of India (CJI) have had little time to articulate their judicial philosophy in judgments so soon after assuming office. Either administrative responsibilities have overwhelmed them, or they have had limited opportunities to do so during their short tenures, dictated by the fact that they retire upon turning 65. But CJI N.V. Ramana, who has a limited tenure of one year and four months, appears to be bucking the trend, with four significant judgments emerging from benches presided by him, three of which he has authored.
1. Courts must intervene to prevent brazen persecution
In Sanjay Kumar Rai v State of Uttar Pradesh, authored by Justice Surya Kant, who was part of the bench presided by CJI Ramana and Justice Aniruddha Bose, the Supreme Court held on May 7 that ‘discharge’ from wrongful prosecution is a valuable right provided to the accused. Although it is well settled that the trial court, while considering the discharge application from an accused, is not to act as a mere post office, it required a robust restatement of law from the office of the CJI to send a clear message to the courts below. The bench reiterated the law that the trial court has to sift through the evidence in order to find out whether there are sufficient grounds to try the suspect, consider the broad probabilities, total effect of evidence and documents produced and the basic infirmities appearing in the case, and so on.
More importantly, the bench made it clear that when the contents of a complaint or the other purported material on record represents a brazen attempt to persecute an innocent person, it becomes imperative upon the court to prevent the abuse of process of law.
In this case, the complainant alleged that the appellant threatened to kill him over a telephone conversation, which he had initiated and put on speaker, with two witnesses to listen to the conversation. The appellant-accused sought his discharge under Section 239 CrPC, contending that the complainant had falsely implicated him and the allegation of telephonic threats does not constitute an offence under Sections 504 and 506 of IPC (dealing with criminal intimidation). It was further averred that the investigation was not fair and was unilateral in its approach, wherein the investigating officer had made no efforts to find out the truth and had instead relied on the statement of the complainant and other planted witnesses to fasten a case against the appellant. The investigating officer did not deem it necessary to take the version of the appellant on record or consider his side of the story. A charge sheet came to be filed against the appellant/accused under Sections 504 and 506 IPC based on the statement of the complainant and the affidavits of two witnesses alone.
The chief judicial magistrate did not agree with the appellant’s plea and rejected his discharge application. Aggrieved by the order, the appellant approached the high court through a criminal revision petition, seeking reversal of the CJM’s order.
The high court dismissed the criminal revision petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC. The high court did not examine the issue in detail to find out whether the continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of law, the bench held. Significantly, the bench drew its support from a post-emergency case decided by the Supreme Court (Madhu Limaye v State of Maharashtra (1977)) which said that though the power of the high court to interfere with an order framing charge is to be exercised only in a exceptional situation, this bar would not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the court and/or to secure the ends of justice, having regard to the facts and circumstance of individual cases.
The Ramana bench made it clear that it does not recommend a complete hands off approach in cases where. there is likelihood of serious prejudice to the rights of a citizen.
2. Anticipatory bail has direct bearing on right to life, liberty
In Nathu Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, the question before the court was whether the Allahabad high court, while dismissing the anticipatory bail applications of the respondents, could have granted them protection from arrest till they surrendered within the period of 90 days as stipulated by the court. The high court apparently resorted to grant “protection from arrest” rather than anticipatory bail, in order to avoid giving reasons under the latter.
The appellants-complainants in this case challenged before the Supreme Court the power of the high court to pass such a protective order after the dismissal of the anticipatory bail application. The Ramana bench held that the grant or rejection of an application under Section 438 CrPC has a direct bearing on the fundamental right to life and liberty of an individual. The provision, therefore, needs to be read liberally, and considering its beneficial nature, the courts must not read in limitations or restrictions that the legislature have not explicitly provided for, the bench held. Any ambiguity in the language must be resolved in favour of the applicant seeking relief, the bench clarified.
In particular, the bench explained that the proviso to Section 438(1) Cr.P.C. does not act as a bar to the grant of additional protection to the applicant. The bench traced the source of the high court’s power to grant such protection to Section 482 CrPC which recognises the high court’s inherent power to pass orders to secure the ends of justice. This provision, the bench held, reflects the reality that no law or rule can possibly account for the complexities of life, and the infinite range of circumstances that may arise in the future.
The Ramana bench explained that even when the court is not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to an accused, there may be circumstances where the high court is of the opinion that it is necessary to protect the person apprehending arrest for some time, due to exceptional circumstances, until they surrender before the trial court. For example, the applicant may plead protection for some time as he/she is the primary caregiver or breadwinner of his/her family members, and needs to make arrangements for them. In such extraordinary circumstances, when a strict case for grant of anticipatory bail is not made out, and rather the investigating authority has made out a case for custodial investigation, it cannot be stated that the high court has no power to ensure justice.
More importantly, the Ramana bench equated Section 482 CrPC with a similar power enjoyed by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution to pass such an order.
The bench, however, added that such an order must necessarily be narrowly tailored to protect the interests of the applicant while taking into consideration the concerns of the investigating authority, and that such an order must be a reasoned one. As the high court in this case granted the impugned relief to the respondents without assigning any reasons, the Ramana bench allowed the appeals from the complainant-appellants, and set aside the high court order granting protection for 90 days, which it found unreasonable in the present facts and circumstances. “Such a direction by the high court exceeds its judicial discretion and amounts to judicial largesse, which the courts do not possess,” the bench held.
3. Plugging a key loophole in dowry death law
In two judgments dealing with dowry deaths, the Ramana bench was concerned that the menace of dowry deaths is increasing day by day. It sought to further tighten the law by plugging loopholes, without compromising natural justice to the accused husband and his family members.
In Satbir Singh & another v State of Haryana, the appellants were convicted by the trial court and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and five years for the offences under Sections 304-B (dowry death) and 306 IPC (abetment to suicide) respectively. The high court upheld the order of the trial court.
The appellants argued in this case that the prosecution failed to prove that the demand for dowry, assuming there was one, was made proximate to the death of the deceased-victim. The prosecution, however, told the court that the suspicious death of the victim occurred within almost one year of marriage.
Section 304B(1) provides that ‘dowry death’ is where death of a woman is caused by burning or bodily injuries or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances, within seven years of marriage, and it is shown that soon before her death, (emphasis added) she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband, in connection with demand for dowry.
The Ramana bench acknowledged that the phrase “soon before” occurring in this section is to be interpreted strictly, as it is a criminal statute. However, the bench added, where strict interpretation leads to absurdity or goes against the spirit of legislation, the courts may in appropriate cases place reliance upon the genuine import of the words, taken in their usual sense to resolve such ambiguities.
Considering the significance of Dowry Prohibition Act, a strict interpretation would defeat the very object for which it was enacted. Therefore, the bench reasoned, it is safe to deduce that when the legislature used the words “soon before” they did not mean “immediately before”. Rather, they left its determination in the hands of the courts.
The Ramana bench further reasoned that the courts should use their discretion to determine if the period between the cruelty or harassment and the death of the victim would come within the term “soon before”. What is pivotal to the above determination, is the establishment of a “proximate and live link” between the cruelty and the consequential death of the victim, the bench held.
In this case, the bench concluded that the death of the victim was relatable to burn injuries within seven years of marriage. The bench found that there existed a live and proximate link between the instances of demand of dowry and the death of deceased. The trial court and the high court, upon a close appreciation of the witnesses, concluded that the statements were corroborative and consistent. They found the witnesses to be reliable and held that the deceased was subjected to cruelty soon before her death as she failed to bring sufficient dowry. The Ramana bench, having found that the ingredients of Section 304-B IPC were satisfied, held that the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act operates against the appellants, who are deemed to have caused the offence.
However, as the bench found insufficient evidence to support the prosecution theory that the death of the victim occurred due to suicide, it set aside the conviction and sentence of the accused under Section 306 IPC, for abetment.
4. Guidelines relating to dowry death cases
In Gurmeet Singh v State of Punjab, the same bench found that the prosecution has proved the necessary ingredients under section 304-B IPC (i.e. dowry death) against the accused-appellant. In this case, the appellant argued that without any charges under section 498-A, IPC (cruelty to women), a conviction under Section 304-B IPC cannot be sustained.
The Ramana bench held that although cruelty is a common thread existing in both the offences, the ingredients of each offence are distinct and must be proved separately by the prosecution. If a case is made out, there can be a conviction under both the sections, the bench held.
The bench found that the high court and the trial court did not commit any error in convicting the appellant under section 304-B IPC, as the appellant had failed to discharge the burden of rebutting the assumption under section 113-B Evidence Act.
In both these cases, the Ramana bench has laid down detailed guidelines relating to trial under section 304-B IPC. First, the trial courts have an obligation to question the accused fairly, with care and caution. The court must put incriminating circumstances before the accused and seek his response. The bench cautioned that the legal provisions should not be allowed to be misused as delay tactics by the accused. The bench advised the trial court to be cautious in its approach, because sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even though they have no active role in commission of the offence, and are residing at distant places.
The orders and judgments emanating from the CJI Ramana-led benches in important and sensitive cases may tempt observers to infer that the CJI – as the master of the roster – can play a key role in influencing the outcome of these cases by deciding the composition of these benches. This was evident when the bench of CJI Ramana and Justices Surya Kant and A.S. Bopanna had in its order on April 28 directed the authorities to provide adequate and effective medical assistance to Siddique Kappan, presently lodged in Mathura jail, and to allay all apprehensions relating to his health. The bench had found it would be in the interest of justice to shift him to a hospital in Delhi for proper medical treatment.
But the hearing in the above four cases were concluded and judgments reserved before Justice Ramana assumed the office of the CJI, and the master of the roster; therefore, the credit for assigning these cases to the Ramana bench should go to his predecessors.
It may be too early to assume that the assumption of office as the CJI by Justice Ramana constitutes a paradigm shift, but when seen with similar orders emanating from Justice Ashok Bhushan bench in the suo motu case for providing relief to the migrants during the lockdowns, the present indeed suggests a yearning on the part of several judges of the Supreme Court to overcome the image of a court uncritically accepting what the executive submits, in order to restore the people’s trust in the institution. This is what the post-Emergency Supreme Court was credited with doing, in order to restore the loss of its reputation during the Emergency, when it refused to stand up for the citizen’s precious rights to life and liberty.Only the remainder of CJI Ramana’s term will confirm whether the Supreme Court has rediscovered its post-Emergency phase once again.
SOURCE ; THE WIRE
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